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CYBER RESILIENCE: 
WHAT IS IT AND HOW DO WE GET IT?
JASON R.C. NURSE
In today’s world, cyber-attacks seem as routine as the common cold. In the security industry, many live 
by mantras such as, ‘it is not a question of if you will be hacked, it is a question of when’ and ‘assume that 
you have already been breached.’ With these words in mind, the key considerations therefore are: how 
should organisations respond and what factors are essential to be resilient in the face of a constantly 
evolving threat landscape.
Our world is driven by technology. It supports personal and 
organisational interaction and is a core source of innovation, 
enterprise and defence. The benefi ts of technology are, 
however, not without their concerns. One of the largest of 
these is the prevalence of cyber-attacks and the reality that as 
digital technologies and cyber-physical systems become more 
ubiquitous, such attacks can have a much wider reach. 
A cyber-attack on an organisation might not only cause a few 
systems to be o¡  ine, it can impact the surrounding supply chain, 
a government’s infrastructure or even lead to a loss of life. As a 
result of these issues, there has been a signifi cant push for cyber 
security research and practice to aid in combating the threat. 
Primarily, this has focused on protective, detective and reactive 
security measures. If we ascribe to the mantras above, which are 
held by many security professionals in the fi eld, then reactive 
security controls and cyber resilience more broadly, is critical to 
the continuity of an organisation.
CYBER RESILIENCE: WHAT IS IT? 
Resilience is the capability to quickly react and recover from 
challenges or di¢  culties. Cyber resilience extends the notion 
of resilience to cyber-related incidents (deliberate attacks or 
accidental mishaps). It seeks to explore and defi ne ways through 
which organisations can create systems, business processes and 
services that are able to rapidly ‘bounce back’ after a cyber-attack. 
This can be taken one step 
further to regard true cyber 
resilience as bouncing 
back to a stronger position 
than the organisation was 
in prior to the attack. The 
idea in this case is that a 
resilient enterprise would 
thoroughly investigate the 
incident and learn from it, 
and therefore that incident 
and others like it, would not 
be successful in the future.
While cyber resilience has been discussed for some time, 
particularly in the military and Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI) domains, there is still not a clear consensus on exactly how 
to achieve it. What is agreed however, is that there are several 
key principles which should be adopted and customised to each 
enterprise’s security context. These are Prepare, Absorb, Recover 
and Adapt. 
Preparation is crucial and relates to developing preventative 
measures and defi ning an appropriate response plan for a range 
of potential cyber incidents. In cases where prevention fails, an 
organisation should seek to absorb the attack through layered 
security approaches which draw on technical, procedural and 
human elements. Incident recovery is responsible for ensuring 
business and mission continuity during and after an attack. This 
is the area often most linked to resilience itself, but it is actually 
only a part of the resilience puzzle. Finally, technology and cyber-
attacks change and evolve, so in order for organisations to be 
cyber resilient they must adapt constantly. This will be necessary 
with consideration of the systems used, the security postures 
assumed, and in the trial and adoption of new types of security 
technology (e.g., artifi cial intelligence in cyber security).  
BETTER CYBER RESILIENCE THROUGH 
AN ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF
CYBERHARMS
One current area of research which has a great deal to off er the 
topic of cyber resilience is that of organisational ‘cyber-harms’. 
The term cyber-harm describes the damage occurring as a result 
of an attack perpetrated wholly or partially through digital 
infrastructures, and the data, information, applications and 
devices that these infrastructures are composed of. 
While the notion behind cyber-harm is not new, what is novel 
is the conceptualisation by new research of the variety of harm 
types that can arise from a cyber-attack. These have been 
characterised by way of a taxonomy of cyber-harms, with the 
fi ve main categories as follows: Physical or Digital harm (e.g., 
exposure of confi dential data), Economic harm (e.g., disrupted 
missions or operations), Psychological harm (e.g., confusion or 
anxiety faced by customers or employees), Reputational harm 
(e.g., damaged defence or enterprise brand) and Social and 
Societal harm (e.g., negative impact on the nation). 
The enhanced understanding of harms that may result 
from cyber-incidents is extremely valuable because it forces 
organisations to broaden their thinking on what they need to 
protect against, and thus better appreciate the comprehensive 
nature of cyber resilience. Currently, when most organisations 
refl ect on cyber risk and its management, the focus is on direct 
harms to themselves (e.g., disruption of services) or their 
customers and suppliers (e.g., loss of confi dential or private data). 
However, the connectivity of modern-day systems means such a 
limited view is no longer su¢  cient, given that the harm emerging 
from cyber-attacks can easily propagate and aggregate.
One interesting case example is the malware and denial-of-
service attack on a Ukraine powerplant in December 2015. This 
was one of the fi rst incidents that demonstrated the importance 
of incident recovery and resilience in the cyber-physical systems 
CNI domain. Through a series of carefully crafted attacks, 
hackers were able to seize direct control of power systems from 
o¢  cial operators, and eventually cut power to an estimated 
225,000 people in one of the coldest months of the year.  
While all of the details of this case have not been revealed, 
there are undoubtedly questions around the plant’s prevention 
and response defences, as well as whether there was a full 
consideration of the harms to consumers without power at 
such a time. A Prepare-Absorb-Recover-Adapt approach that 
incorporates, and thus reasons about, the full complement 
of cyber-harms could have helped planning for this case. In 
particular, it would have supported an adequate scoping of how 
a malware attack could impact internal and external operations, 
and how such a vast number of cyber-harms could propagate and 
mount over short periods of time. Here, harms can be witnessed 
in not only the internal environment, but psychologically (in 
terms of individuals who faced hardship) and societal (lack of 
trust in connected CNI systems). This and similar analyses can 
be applied across a wide range of current and future cyber-attack 
cases.
As we look towards creating organisations, infrastructure and 
systems that can eff ectively withstand cyber-attacks, cyber 
resilience will become an even more signifi cant consideration. 
Any factors that can further inform and enhance the resilience 
process will provide organisations with a greater advantage in 
preparing for attacks and recovering quickly when they arise. 
We believe that cyber-harm is one of such factors and that its 
integration can provide the pathway for a more holistic form 
of cyber resilience, where organisations are well-prepared for 
responding to all types of attacks and harms.
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